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TRANSFORMATIONSl
C. Terry Warner,· Ph.D.

1

right and you're wrong," we are probably wrong. Behind
this kind of selfserving judgment is an attitude that puts
all the weight on what the other person claims and none
upon his real beliefs, his attitude, the condition of his
heart.
The second idea I wan t to expand upon--it is closely
~elated to the first--is "reframing." This is an idea that,
In one form or another, has played an important part in
contemporary philosophy. A "frame" or "outlook" or
"p.uadigm" or "world," as I shall use these terms, can be
thought of as more basic than a theory, or it can be
thought of as a very basic theory. Ordinarily, a theory is
a set of principles that helps us explain what we see
going on in the world of our experience, that we would
not otherwise understand. A person's theory can change
while his world of experience, or basic outlook,'remains
substantially the same. But that world or outlook too
may change: one's presuppositions can become altered
so profoundly that what in the former world of
experience were hard, incontrovertible facts may in the
new world be insignificant or non-existent. In the
Newtonian world-system light is propagated in a
straight line; it was not just our theory of the world but
facts we accepted that Einstein changed when his work
on the General Theory of Relativity correctly predicted
that light would bend conformably to the gravitational
field of a heavenly body. When a theory is so
fundamentally different from its rivals that adopting it
~ould alter our world of experience entirely, we may call
It an outlook or paradigm.
Characteristically our operative beliefs are
continually being revised in this small particular or that,
but only on rare occasion is a clean sweep, a 'conversion:
made, in which one's entire operative outlook is
transformed, new categories of thinking come into play,
p.rev.l~usly conspicuous objects and events acquire new
SIgnifICanCe, go unnoticed or disappear, and new ones
emerge. 'Reframing' is a metaphor too weak to capture
thIS profound transformation of outlook, in which not
Just the frame but the angle of vision, the lighting, the
ranges of the various senses, the classification scheme
the interests, the meanings of the words with which w~
talk about ourselves and others--in short, every factor
affecting the way we apprehend our world--all undergo
change. As a consequence one world of experience, or
outlook, may have little or nothing in common with
another.
Faith is one kind of frame or outlook; the kind of
sCience that takes itself to be "objective" is another.
From within the "objective" frame the world of
spiritually minded people is inaccessible, and the reports
and conduct of these people are construed as being very
different from what they themselves understand. The
experience-world of the spiritually minded likewise
precludes the "objective" outlook. Their understanding
of the reports and conduct of people with the "objective"
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outlook is not at all like the understanding that those
people themselves have. The greatest discrepancies
between what an individual thinks he is doing and what
he is really doing come when "what he is really doing" is
observed, however open-mindedly, from a frame or
paradigm different from his own.
The reader can now understand why a point-by-point
response to Johnson's analysis of my lecture would be
misleading. That analysis implicitly reframes what I had
to say, and hence applies to some other view than my
own. A point-by-point response would suggest that it
erred in its particulars, when what needs to be said is
that, at least in the beliefs that we espouse, we are
operating from different outlooks.
But how, then, can one individual respond to another
when theirs seems to be a diversity of paradigms rather
than a diversity of facts? For me, there can be only one
answer to this question--an answer that modifies and
brings a new dimension to what I have just said about
outlooks. It is that though our espoused and even our
present operative outlooks may be different, potentially
at least there is an operative outlook that we share. This
is the common ground upon which we can come
together. In what we think we believe we may
misrepresent or even try to repudiate these deepest
beliefs. But we can just as easily give up our efforts to
insist upon our separateness and our freedom from
others' claims upon us, and look past the transitory
divergencies of our views to the day when we will see
eye to eye because we are of one heart.
To respond in the standard, argumentative way would
be too much like taking up the sword to dissuade others
from taking up the sword. If we live by theory we shall
die by theory. Where we meet is holy ground, and we
come there not to die, but to live. Consequently that
ground is not a projected ideal limit of scientific
agreement toward which we sometimes think we are
tending but will never achieve. It is love, and it is
available to us now and in every moment just as readily
as honesty with ourselves is available. When we meet on
common ground it is as sisters and brothers, beyond
evidence, agreement, and theory. We will understand
more than we understand now when we have succeeded
in pounding our swords into ploughshares.
But surely, someone will want to say at this point, it
must make a difference if we profess one view of things
and act on another. Sooner or later that kind of
incongruence has got to get in the way. It must matter
what theories and theologies we profess.
The answer to this objection is that though theoretical
considerations have their uses, in the long run, I think,
they are destined for obsolescence. My expectation is
that, for the faithful, there will one day be no question
whether some behavioral, cognitive, or agency
formulation is "correct." When we reach that point, our
outlook will no longer generate the anomalies and
puzzles that we presently try to explain by constructing
theories. In my own work--and I shall discuss this
presently--I discovered that certain long-standing selfcontradictions in the dominant paradigm of human
behavior in our culture cannot be eliminated within that

paradigm. On the other hand, there is an outlook from
within which these self-contradictions do not exist. It is
the outlook I tried to express in the lecture I mentioned,
and that I have called the "agency" outlook. You can
imagine my wonder when I realized, first, that this
outlook (which, I hope, is but an awkward and
temporary approximation to the outlook that one
progressively acquires as one tries to live the gospel) can
account for all the observations that lend credence to the
dominant paradigm, and, second, that from within this
agency outlook these self-contradictions do not even
arise. My predecessors have thought tha t to solve these
problems we had to learn more about human behavior,
whereas the difficulty lay in our holding that dominant
outlook. The solution is to change ourselves, not to get
more information. So it dots matter what we believe
about the world, but ultimately, I am suggesting, that
fact will not incline us toward one theory or another,for
we will be beyond theory and beyond feeling any need to
justify or explain ourselves, or represent ourselves as
holding a particular theory. Nevertheless, for the
present, theory is useful, and so is a theory of theories
and a theory of outlooks: otherwise we would be unable
to comprehend the pitfalls and limits of theory or the
gains and losses accompanying a shift in one's operative
outlook.
Consistent with this conclusion, the somewhat
theoretical, somewhat autobiographical remarks that
follow are meant not to oppose any particular position
but to say we must get beyond all positions. The ironic
and sobering thing about my saying all this is that those
who disagree with my espousal of this agency view (the
view that we need to respond to one another not as
theorists but as sisters and brothers) may be more
agentive in their real, operative beliefs than I.
2. Sin as a Scientific Concept
After I had been working for some time on the
theoretical problems I will describe in a moment, and had
begun to think of disturbed feelings as the responsibility
of those who have them, I realized that the thoughts I
was having were ancient rather than modern. They can
be found in Confucian and Buddhist texts, in Sophocles
and Plato, in the Gospels and the letters of Paul. The
wine I recommend is not simply old, but vintage, and I
have had nothing to do with pressing it.
Contemporary versions of this idea are generally not
as good as the ancient ones. 111 mention three examples.
Some people say that disturbed feelings are not just
similar to, but in fact art purposive behaviors--though
they are experienced as involuntary. They may be
manipulative, protective, or simply communicative.
Others say such feelings are not just experienced as
involuntary, but art involuntary, yet at the same time are
used somehow to accomplish manipulative, protective,
or communicative purposes. There is a third group who
maintain that disturbed feelings are involuntary
products in our affective lives of mistaken beliefs about
ourselves and our world.
What I had found about disturbed feelings is different
from each of these contemporary views, and yet it
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deceiving himself about what he is doing. But if the
intrapsychic situation were set up 'in this way, selfdeception could not take place. As Jean-Paul Sartre once
wrote, the self-deceiver "would have to know the truth
very exactly in order to hide it from himself the more
carefully." He would have to know the truth in order to
keep himself from knowing it. And this is impossible.
Beginning with Freud, who first wrote about repression
and the unconscious nearly a century ago, many
ingenious attempts have been made in several fields to
construct a model of the psyche in which self-deception
would not incur this contradiction and therefore be
possible; but as I have shown in my theoretical work'
these models have failed. The idea of someone adopting
or employing a feeling purposefully and independently
deceiving himself about what he is doing is an impossible
idea.
For the better part of a decade I sought a solution,
knowing that with it would come a view of human
beings that is wholly unlike any thing available in the
scholarly world. The kind of solution that was required
gradually became clear. It would not do at all to think of
self-deception as a two-stage act consisting first of
perceiving about oneself something threatening or
intolerable and then, in a separate act, deceiving oneself
about it. There had to be a kind of act the very
performance of which would be a self-deception, in that
one could not both perform it and understand it. Nor
could that misunderstanding be merely accidental; it had
to be in the nature of the act that by it the individual
systematically deceives himself about it.
Sartre wrote an important book in which he tried to
show that every human act whatsoever fits these
qualifications, including basic acts of consciousness like
perception, desire, belief, etc. Every act whatever, he
said, is a striving that we who perform it cannot
understand; hence, just to be a human being is,
unavoidably, to be self-deceived. Thus Sartre began
with the difficult problem of how self-deception is
possible but ended by creating the even more difficult
problem of how being out of self-deception is possible.
What is more, his analysis breaks down at a crucial point.
But it is an important analysis and I mention it here
becau.se Sartre is the only other writer in this field to
realize that self-deception cannot happen unless there is
a kind of action that in its very nature is a self-deception,
without any further effort on the agent's part.
After a protracted, systematic analysis marked by
many failures, I finally was able to isolate the properties
that self-deceiving behavior must have. And then I
realized that the only kind of act that possessed all the
required properties was what I came to call "selfbetrayal," and what James defines as "sin.""To him that
knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin:'
Games 4:17) Sin (in James' sense) is the act which cannot
be performed and understood by one and the same
person at the same time. For as I discovered, it is not
possible for a person to sin without trying to evade
responsibility for doing so (except perhaps in the
extraordinary case in which an individual chooses evil

explains why perceptive individuals would formulate
such views. It explains why people wO\lld appear to be
purposive in their feelings, why there is nevertheless a
legitimate sense in which these feelings are involuntary,
and why there is, as the more cognitively oriented
mentalities (like Aaron Beck) suppose, a perfect
correlation between feelings and deepest beliefs.
Thus my view--or I should say, the vintage view,for it
did not start with me--is a comprehensive one. It unifies
these other views of emotional problems, each of which
if taken by itself is not only partial but also misleading.
For as we shall see presently, if the purposive view were
correct, disturbed feelings could not be experienced as
involuntary, and if either the involuntary or the
cognitive view were correct, these feelings could not
have the defensive and resistant qualities that they have.
The contemporary versions of the ancient idea consist of
alert observations that are as sound as they can be given
the general outlook from which they are made. But that
outlook is inadequate. The vintage view "reframes"
these observations, both preserving them and
transforming them so that they are consistent with one
another and part of a complete outlook on behavior.
Consider the idea that disturbed feelings are
voluntary and purposive, though experienced as
involuntary. (Later I will mention the other views in
passing.) I am told that if Milton Erickson and other
"strategic therapists" hold this idea, their version of it is
different from the standard version; therefore I will
defer discussion of them until later. What I want to say
about the standard version is that contrary to what its
advocates intend, it presupposes that our deepest beliefs
are both disturbed and not our responsibility--not
purposive at all. To see this, consider the following
situation. A certain therapist regards his client, Jane, as
manipulating her parents by the angry way she feels. It
appears that employing this feeling is, in a certain broad
sense, something Jane is doing; the feeling is purposive, a
kind of behavior on Jane's part. But let us try to find out
more about this feeling. What has motivated Jane to
employ it in order to manipulate her parents? The
answer can only be that, apart from her manipulative
feeling, Jane has found it necessary or advantageous to
manipulate them in order to achieve or protect some
interest of hers. In other words, in her eyes her parents
have been threatening to that interest. This means that
completely apart from her purposive feelings, Jane must
have been having some other, deeper, disturbed
feelings--feelings of being threatened in some way--for
which she could not be responsible. So sooner or later
the purposive view leads us to deepest motivations
which cannot be voluntary and purposive. Thus the
purposive view ultimately undercuts itself. It is but a
variation of the view it thinks it is denying, namely, that
we are not responsible for our disturbed feelings.
There is another problem with the purposive view. If
disturbed feelings were if fact purposive it would be
impossible for us to experience them as involuntary,
which we do. For under these conditions the individual
who is purposefully doing things by means of his
feelings would have to undertake some action of
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for its own sake). He may feel accusingly toward others
or the circumstances--feel he is their victim--and see
them as responsible for what he is doing and feeling. Or,
he may evade responsibility by blaming something he
thinks is uncontrollable in himself--his laziness,
unworthiness, etc. In other words, it is not possible for a
person to sin and simultaneously to comprehend the
significance of what he is doing (again, with the possible
exception of the extraordinary sort of case I mentioned).
Because of his accusing heart, it is not possible for him to
sin and simultaneously to see either himself or others as
they are. In short, it is not possible for him to love them
purely. He becomes a victim striving to make himself
justified in his compwmise of himself, and in so doing
cannot simultaneously comprehend that this is what he
is doing. Indeed, if he "confesses" his sin without a
broken heart and contrite spirit the words he uses will
not mean to him what they would have meant had he,
.
being repentant, given up his sin.
The agency outlook is not a new piece of information
about human behavior, but instead an outlook on the
whole of the human character and situation, and this
outlook comprehensively takes in all of the alert
observations about behavior that various thinkers have
emphasized in a manner that transforms each of them in
a single coherent totality. This is what a good paradigm
or outlook should accomplish.
Let us look at an example of the transforming power
of this outlook. It preserves all the observations
suggesting that having disturbed feelings is voluntary or
purposive, and yet it preserves all of the observations
that suggest that having these feelings is involuntary. In
the standard paradigm these two kinds of observations
don't fit together, and so some thinkers feel bound to say
that the feelings are voluntary or purposive and others
feel bound to say that the feelings are involuntary. From
the perspective of the agency outlook they are neither
voluntary nor involuntary, but possess properties that
explain why they appear to be both voluntary and
involuntary. Let us see why this is so.
Agentively speaking, the individual sees the world
distortedly at the same time and in the same act as he
maintains his disturbed feelings about it. The reason for
this is that his feelings and his perceptions are identical;
they are aspects of a single attitude; the one does not
precede the other. Consequently, he is disturbed in his
perceptions as well as his feelings. (That is why we
would expect cognitive therapists to obtain the results
that they do obtain and repeatedly to find confirmation
of their views.) There is no space of time or mediation
between the individual's perceptions, imaginations, or
memories and his affective response; there is no poin tat
which he deliberates, plans, or decides what feelings he
will have. The people whom he seems to indulge or
punish, protect or manipulate, are perceived by him as
provoking, arousing, or deserving his response. Thus he
need not be either cunning or malicious; from his point
of view, he is certain that the circumstances are calling
forth his reactions and that he is therefore not being
false to what he perceives. It would be wrong to say that
his feelings are purposive, planned, intentionally

adopted, or voluntary, and on the other hand it would be
just as wrong to say that they are involuntary--that is
caused by external circumstances as he thinks they are.
And yet, the observations that have led people to say
that they are purposive and voluntary are alert
observations and can be preserved, and so are the
observations that have led people to say that they are not
voluntary. Thus does the agency outlook, which holds
that disturbed feelings are the responsibility of the
individual who has them, explain why observers are able
to gather evidence of an involuntary dimension in those
feelings.
This also explains why the disturbed individual cannot
realize that he is ultimately responsible. It is because he
has access to no other world than his self-deceived one,
in which he experiences himself as not responsible, and
thus cannot compare the way he sees things to "the
correct" way. Even his attempts to "look into his own
heart"--to examine his feelings while he is having them-are distortions. Any evidence that otherwise might lead
him to realize that his perceptions are distorted is also
distorted. With every new experience he reinforces
himself in his self-deception. This, I think, is what Jesus
called the bondage of sin.
Given this bondage, in which the individual is
convinced his disturbed feelings are caused by the
circumstances, it is not surprising that, to many
observers, human beings appear to be motivated
primarily by self-protective and self-seeking needs and
instinct--needs that the circumstances can deprive and
instincts that the circumstances can arouse. To these
observers, the insensitivity, cruelty, and emotional
suffering in this world result from the way we are--from
our "natures." Shortage of goods and opportunities
means that all cannot be simultaneously satisfied and
that those deprived will tend to act aggressively. It
means too that others, provoked or aroused, will react
aggressively or defenSively, and will in this way provoke
those who provoked them. Ultimately, the daily human
calamity that is life on this earth unfolds simply because
that is "the way we are." This is the explicit opinion of
those who say that our disturbed feelings are caused by
external circumstances, and, as we have seen, the
implied opinion of those who say that our feelings are
purposive.
But this widespread "naturalistic" outlook leaves us
unable to account for all the observations that have led
people to say that disturbed feelings are purposive. It
leaves us at a loss to explain the counterexamples to the
thesis that human beings are ultimately self-serving
mechanisms. The people whose love and forgiveness are
uncompromised even by severe deprivation and abuse
are ignored by this view. Ignored also is Christ's doctrine
that not only allows for the possibility of unreciprocated
and unrewarded love but actually stipulates that each of
us ought to have it. Even under the most extreme
conditions, He both expects of us and promises to us,
peace, love, and forgiveness. Therefore it is not enough
to explain the antisocial behavior of human beings; an
adequate outlook must also account for their goodness.
And this, as I have suggested, cannot be done by any
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was not new information ora fresh bit of cleverness, but
an entirely new outlook at the center of which is a kind
of behavior that is indiscriminable\.. from what James
called "sin". Ironically, then, the concept of sin, rejected
by many behavioral scientists, turns out to be
indispensable for an adequate understanding of the
observations that all of them make daily.
The reader can see why I would think of myself as
moving toward unification in the human sciencestoward a theory which would bring the disparate
hypotheses and data of may different researchers and
practitioners into a single, simple, elegant, and
comprehensive order--and why at the same time others
might suppose that I had crossed into forbidden and
highly unscientific territory. I would like briefly to
consider this odd situation.
In a strict sense, my use of the concept of self-betrayal
or sin violates no scientific canon. It does not introduce
any theorist's or scientist's or therapist's personal values
or value judgments. It does not say of any individual that
he or she is morally right or wrong. The concept of selfbetrayal restricts itself altogether to the violation by an
individual of his own values, not anyone else's. This
concept therefore has neither bias nor subjectivity
associated with it. It merely recognizes the fact that
human beings often do have values and in their conduct
may either conform to these values or violate them.
Hence the concept of self-betrayal or sin, so defined, is
not "unscientific;" and whether it ought to be utilized in
the explanation of behavior should, scientifically
speaking, be determined solely by whether a theory or
outlook of which it is an indispensable part is a better
theory than its rivals--whether it is simpler, more
predictive, etc. To approach the matter in any other
way--to rule out in advance a legitimate potential
solution to a scientific problem--is the quintessence of
the antiscientific attitude. From this point of view,
ironically, behavioral scientists who disallow my
position out of hand are acting prejudicially against
science. Everyone, even those who think of themselves
as the purest of scientists, is eligible to wear the robes of
Pope Urban.
Many professionals in the fields of behavioral and
social science do sustain this prejudice, refusing to think
that the moral and spiritual dimensions of their lives are
relevant to the explanation of conduct. (Indeed, they
typically think of those dimensions as needing to be
explained by more "scientific" factors). These
professionals sometimes deal with "objectively
identifiable behaviors" presumed to be associated with
morality or spirituality, e.g. church activity,
philanthropic contributions, assessments made by
others on a benevolence scale, etc. There are two
problems with this. The first problem may be expressed
in the form of a dilemma. Either it is presumed that such
behaviors correlate with moral or spiritual qualities or
else that they are being studied solely for their own sake.
If the latter, then moral or spiritual qualities are
avowedly not being studied. If the former, then it must
be admitted that it is an extra-scientific enterprise, and a
matter of the researcher's own conception of morality or

outlook in which we are not responsible for our feelings,
and it cannot be done by any outlook in which we are
responsible for them in the sense that Y(e adopt or utilize
them to accomplish our purposes.
.
I can summarize by saying that only the vintage
outlook, of which the agency outlook is a diluted form,
can do this. It does this by making use of the concept of
sin (in James' sense). By means of this concept wecan say
how it is that people can appear for the most part to be
motivated self-seekingly, being in the bondage of sin,
and yet be able, by repentance, to live completely free of
such motivation. On this view, too, self-seeking
dispositions, while patently in play, are not an inherent
part of us, but instead are what we or our forebears have
set up in us through sin. This is how "the natural man"
can be "an enemy to God," but not unchangeably. By
obedience we can "(put) off the natural man" and
become again, what we once were, "as a child,
submissive, meek, humble, patient, full of love"--in
short, "a saint throught the atonement of Christ the
Lord." (Mosiah 3:29) Thus in my quest for
understanding I have come to an outlook in which the
concept of sin, about as unfashionable as it can be in the
world of behavioral science, is indispensable for
constructing any theory from which the properties of
troubled and even much "mentally ill" behavior can be
deduced.
This is not any sort of new discovery. When the
solution to the venerable problem of self-deception
finally emerged, I and my associates in the Moral Studies
Group at BYU reflected frequently on the fact that what
we had come to believe was not new. We were well
aware that long prior to our project many others had
pointed out that observations about the behavior of
fallen human beings is to be derived from the concept of
sin. My work has consisted in showing how these
observations can be thus derived.
If it is supposed that our self-seeking is to be explained
by instincts that are permanantly part of our
personalities, then it must also be supposed that we will
be permanently self-seeking and that eternal life will be
a matter of perpetual self-control. (Unless, of course, we
look upon our bodies as the source of those instincts and
therefore long for the day when we can be rid of them:
but of course this is doctrinally false.) If on the other
hand we think that self-seeking dispositions are
purposefully adopted, then we will also tend to believe
that they can be summarily abandoned, by ceasing the
behavior in which we adopt them. (But this view too is
doctrinally false, it makes redemption unnecessary.)
Only a view in which the bondage of sin is real and yet
not necessarily permanent both allows for the possibility
of pure love and makes it contingent upon redemption.
3. "Objectivity" and Faith, Two Outlooks
I did not set out to apply gospel concepts to the
solution of problems in the theory of behavior. Instead, I
set out to consider such problems on their own terms.
And I discovered, as I pushed deeper and deeper into the
conceptual puzzles that are widely recognized in the
literature, that what was needed to solve those puzzles
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spirituality (or the conception of others on whom he is
relying), to suppose these behaviors represent morality
or spirituality. But they may not. Indeed--and this is the
second problem--in any given sample, any or all of these
behaviors may be self-righteously hypocritical and
therefore actually immoral and sophisticatedly lacking
in faith. Hence, insofar as behavioral scientists work
within the prevailing paradigm, they may acquire
information bits about behavior, which they suppose
relevant to the moral and spiritual dimensions of life,
without comprehending either what these bits may
mean or what these dimensions might consist in.
But this is not all of the story. There is, I think, a
powerful reason (which is not to say that it is a good
reason) why many behavioral scientists would reject the
agency outlook without consideration--in other words,
a reason why there is an antiscientific prejudice lying at
the heart of contemporary behavioral science. I would
like to say what I think this reason is. If we consider the
notion of self-betrayal on its own terms, rather than try
to substitute for it a different, behaviorally defined
notion, we feel a moral summons upon our own souls.
For the analysis of self-betrayal is an analysis of what
happens in conjunction with an individual's violating his
own values. It takes effort when working with such a
notion to keep from considering how it applies to
oneself. In effect, the analysis of self-betrayal says,
respond not in the protective guise of a scientist who is
considering behaviors from a detached, impersonal
perspective, but respond as a human being! It seems to
me much harder to avoid considering whether the
material applies to one's own predicament when
working with agency theory than when working with
other theories of motivation. From this I conjecture that
the operative principle behind the general refusal to
think of moral or spiritual commitments as explanatory
of behavior is not, as some may have thought, the sound
principle that the scientist should exclude all subjectioe or biased
factors. The principle behind this refusal seems instead to
be the extrascientific and dubious principle that any idea
from which the scientist cannot keep himself aloof--any idea that
requires him to respond as a total human being rather than as a
detached ..scientist ..··is not tolerable. This is a spurious version
of the legitimate principle.
If what I am saying is so--even if it is only partly so-then perhaps some of what seems real to many human
beings is transformed by the study of it that
contemporary behavioral science tends to make. I do not
mean that this reality that motivates these people is
transformed by science properly so-called, but rather by
a prevailing practice of science. Furthermore, if what I
have said is even partly so, then this practice of science
may not be so much a way of getting at the reality that
motivates other people's behavior but instead as way in
which the practitioner can protect himself from that
reality. And if this is true, the practitioner's private life,
including his personal purposes and values, plays a large
part in the theory that he adopts. For it is on account of
personal and private reasons that he wants to hold
himself aloof and keep his science and his private life
apart. But the effect is the opposite; the scientific

outlook he chooses is biased in favor of his personal,
evasive motivation. Insofar as the self-betrayer keeps
self-betrayal out of his theory of behavior in order to
exclude it as a possible explanation of his own behavior
(whether he realizes that this is what he is doing is
irrelevant), his personal values and commitments have
entered in. It would be difficlt to think of a situation
more ironic than this, for it is precisely in order to avoid
the influence of personal purposes and values that these
behavioral scientists say they won't regard the moral
and spiritual dimensions of life as fundamental.
I am not suggesting that there is another outlook in
which personal purposes and values play no part. On the
contrary, I think they always playa part. Whether one
operates within the prevailing paradigm or from an
agency point of view, impartiality or "objectivity" is
impossible. Either way, the theorist, the scientist, and
the therapist are required to take a stand on the
fundamental issues of their own lives. The
transformation of the world that comes about when we
give credence to the agency outlook is a transformation
of the soul, and so is the opposite transformation that
comes about when we give credence to the prevailing
"objectivist," paradigm. The way we see the world is
what we are, and what we are is the way we see the
world. Which ever paradigm one chooses, the way we
understand human conduct is part of our lives generally;
either it is part of living morally and spiritually, or part of
another way of living.
So it is not suprising that individuals who cherish an
ideal of pure objectivity in science would want to
proscribe all talk of conduct like self-betrayal. In them,
the spurious principle is at work; they want to keep
aloof. But what they do not realize is that their own
theoretical perspective cannot be objective either. Either
we reframe and transform morals and religion in a futile
quest for objectivity or else we reframe and transform
"scientific" observations in a moral quest for rectitude.
We can conduct our professional lives in the fiction that
they are not part of our lives generally, or we can
conduct our professional lives with the intent to live
them well.
Lest anyone think that my talk of the transformation
of science is preposterous, I want to make two points.
We can expect that if a scientific discipline is in
theoretical disarray, as the behavioral sciences are, order
and coherence will be brought to it only by means of an
outlook that will transform even those facts that have
seemed most substantial. When a paradigm changes, the
facts are also changed; sometimes they are replaced and
sometimes their importance is altered. It seems to me
virtually certain that our ideas about the relation of
physiology to behavior (and perhaps even physiological
theory itself), about motivation and morality, about
nurture and learning, and about mental health, must all
undergo significant revision if order is to be brought to
our understanding of human beings. The very
possibility of such revision will always meet with
resistance, because the data against which it is evaluated
have been formulated from the perspective of another,
previously held paradigm. So we should expect revision,
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we are not self-deceived. This means (and we have
already discovered this) th~t in the agency outlook we
cannot hold our moral and spiritual lives separate from
our professional work, even if we try.
Someone might say, "Surely this is false. A therapist
or counsellor obviously can withhold his own ideas and
feelings from his clinical work by refusing to theorize
about behavior altogether, and by concentrating instead
on the techniques that 'work: Le. those that help the
client solve his problem." This pragmatic approach can
draw support from the objectivist outlook, for in that
outlook a therapist's own operative outlook and values
can be presumed irrelevant, just as they are in the
theoretical use of the model that I just mentioned.
But even the meaning of "what works" depends upon
the outlook one has. Consider a therapist who thinks
"works" means that immediate psychic pain has been
relieved. Suppose that he has in mind a client who in fact
has so adapted his expectations and behavior to his
particular experience of the social reality in which he
lives that he is now receiving affirmation and support
from it rather than rejection and abuse. He is, as they
say, "well-adjusted." A therapist in this position is
systematically blind to the possibility that this
accommodation of the client to his surroundings and the
temporary hope that it brings, mask a deeper despair--a
despair whose toll will not be felt for a long time, and
perhaps not fully felt until the next generation. Though
I disagree with R. D. Laing's conception of human
beings, his analysis of the politics of the family and the
fallacy of "adjustment" throws light on this subject.
From the agency point of view, the right kind of help
may be given a client or a friend, but may be rejected by
him. The best thing we can do for another person may
not result in positive change in his life. This is true of the
Lord's own dealings with people. And what frequently
may relieve symptoms may be something the Lord
would not do, and it may backfire in six months, twenty
years, or a generation down the line.
So a therapist is a theorist after all; his own operative
outlook makes a difference even if, adopting the
pragmatic posture, he is determined that it will not. The
very possibility of the agency outlook implies that the
"objec.tive" outlook is not objective, but instead one
alternative outlook among others.
In this connection, the few remarks I promised on the
so-called strategic therapists are in order. It is not easy to
fit these therapists neatly into this discussion. I'm told
that generally they disclaim theoretical and diagnostic
ambitions and are more concerned with bringing about
change. This is in spite of a general agreement among
them that people's problems are social (and especially
familial) in nature, and a matter of dysfunctional
interactions, (rather than individual and
psychopathological) and also an agreement that
individuals' intentions in such dysfunctional
interactions are not necessarily malevolent but often
protective of others. This puts these strategic therapists
in this interesting theoretical position: they can think of
disturbed feelings as purposive without presuming that
the motives behind these feelings are deeper threatened

and we should expect ourselves to be resistant to it.
My second point follows from whatJ have already
said. Ultimately, this revision will not result in the sort
of thing we now call a theory. It will produce instead the
outlook we aquire when being right relative to each
other becomes less important to us than doing right by
each other. To this kind of revision, therefore, there will
be a different, more trenchant kind of resistance. It is
resistance to repentance. It seems to me that if there
ever is to be a time when behavioral science passes from
its now proverbial and prolonged infancy to maturity by
means of a general theory that unites its disparate data
and conflicting schools of opinion, it will be because
behavioral scientists individually open their minds to the
spiritual dimensions of life that their subjects live in but
that many of them, in quest of a will-o'-the-wisp
objectivity--and perhaps to cover their own sins--have
wanted to ignore, reinterpret, or disavow. There will be
this transformation in the understanding of man only
insofar as there is a transformation of men. These are
not two transformations, but one.
Outlooks and Therapy
Let us consider some implications of the ground we
have covered. Agentively speaking, the client's operative
outlook, including the values in terms of which he sees
his world, is not simply the most significant determinant
of his behavior; it is his behavior. By espousing this
outlook I reject the 'objectivist: essentially positivist
viewpoint that says the client's behavior can be
understood without reference to his outlook and the
values that are part of it.
In the objectivist model it is presumed that any
sufficiently trained observer using the right technical
language will be able to identify the client's behavior
correctly. Ideally the observer is a kind of scanning
machine, applying predicates to behavior according to
specified, validated criteria. Thus, the observer's own
operative outlook and values are irrelevant in this
model. Such a model, then, in which the values of the
subject are held aloof, is also a model in which the values
of the observer can be held aloof.
You can see at once that in this objectivist model the
behavior of an individual is separated from his mental
life. Behavior is public and "objective." Mental life is
private and "subjective." Faced with the choice whether
to refer to subjective factors in explaining behavior, in
which case he would not be proceeding scientifically, the
objectivist seeks to explain it by other, "objective:'
"measurable" factors. What I am anxious to have the
reader see is that the subjective slalus of an individual's values is
crealed by Ihe objectivist model. If one does not employ that
model, these values need not be thought of as subjective.
In the agency outlook, on the other hand, an
individual's behavior is not separate from his perception
and evaluation of his world. We cannot hide what we
are. Our operative intentions are manifest for all to see
who are not caught in their own self-deceptions. Hence,
if we can see what another person is doing we will
already understand it. And we will see it if we are living
true to our own values and not betraying them, so that
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and accusing feelings--in other words, without being
forced to the position that disturbed feelings are in fact
not purposive at all.
Yet some may say that these generalizations are not
meant to be theoretical, but are held simply because it is
therapeutically useful to hold them. But I doubt that the
principals of the movement would think this way.
Historically what they have chosen to discount are
psychologies of the individual, not theory as such. I can
see no reason why they would be uncongenial to the
agency outlook, in which individual problems and social
problems are one and the same. In fact, I think it may be
the only theory in. which the members of a group
conspire to produce the problems of each, while each
remains responsible for himself. Such a theory avoids
the pitfalls to which strategic therapists are rightly
sensitive. Perhaps it could give them a means of
considering again the individual's role in the interactive
social process which seems to have his problem as one of
its objectives.
As it is with the strategic therapists, so it is with
therapists' generally. Whether the therapist endorses a
theory of therapy or eschews all such theories, he in fact
operates with an attitude--an operative outlook--of his
own. This attitude comes across to his clients, no matter
how properly methodical he is. And it is to this that the
client primarily reponds. The attitude or outlook
dictates the categories in which the client is perceived
and the categories in which the client is encouraged to
perceive the therapist. The wholeness and the love of
the helper are just about everything that matters;
without these, collusion will probably result--collusion
that on the client's part may even include disappearance
of the presenting problem, but at the cost of new (albeit
more "normal") symptoms introduced by the collusion.
No one is more committed than I to the proposition that
methods are not sufficient, and if used by a disturbed
therapist, dangerous. Nor is anyone more committed to
the proposition that no particular method is even
necessary. Seminars and stories are not necessary, and
neither is hearing the client's story (or not hearing it).
Neither theorist nor therapist can hold himself aloof.
They who think that they can understand their own
work poorly.
Let us tie this discussion back to the remarks that have
been made about values and religion, which in an agency
framework are not subjective and unscientific, but
important aspects of the client's experience, the
therapist's experience, and their relationship.
"Objectively" it may be believed that regarding people
in terms of values and spirituality is condemnatorily
judgmental. But agentively we can understand how the
helper who possesses pure love can see disturbed souls
in terms of the moral categories in which they live
without making any kind of condemnatory judgment of
them. Indeed, in not colluding with them he has no
accusing feelings, no matter what they may be trying to
do to him. In his eyes, they are hurting themselves, not
him, and this means that he sees them compassionately.
I do not see how anyone who in his heart denies this
possibility--the possibility that approaching life in moral

terms is compatible with never condemning anyone-can understand Jesus. He came, as He said, not to
condemn the world but to save it: yet for Him the
fundamental categories of experience were Good and
Evil. It is He whom we must emulate. The reports I have
encountered of those who have stood unresistingly in
His presence have spoken above all of the cleansing,
healing, and unspeakably sublime love that they felt
from Him. When finally we know the truth, I think, we
will understand how intimate is the connection between
righteousness and all absence of condemnatory feelings.
Only the unrighteous hold unrighteous judgments in
their hearts. This conception of moral categories and
judgment is exactly contrary to the prevailing beliefs
that are part of the prevailing, objectivist paradigm.
Here we have yet another example of how everything
changes when one's outlook changes.
In connection with this, it is often supposed that we
can measure therapeutic outcome. But perhaps the best
"therapies"--those that help the honest individual go the
farthest--do not help everyone and would not look
impressive on an outcome test. We have had
professional evaluators monitor the seminars of which I
have spoken, and they've arrived at very encouraging
conclusions. We might be tempted to publicize these
conclusions. But we have chosen not to do this generally,
because these results are beside the point--and they
encourage the audience to miss the point. For we want
each individual to consider the ideas on their own merit,
since the only real evidence we can have of the truth of
things pertaining to spirituality is its effect within our
own hearts when we are being completely true to
ourselves.
This individual confrontation with the truth by each
person, lay or professional, is vital for yet another
reason. Even those good people in the helping services, if
they do not have a gospel understanding, run the risk of
not appreciating and acknowledging the real source of
their success, which is the ever-available Spirit of Truth.
And not understanding this, they will sooner or later
make a false move, misguiding those who are trusting
them. "In nothing doth man offend God, and is against
none is his wrath kindled, save he who doth not
recognize his hand in all things." In short, lacking the
appropriate operative outlook a person will inevitably
transform and despiritualize morality and religion, and
then think he is on good ground when he does not turn
in that direction for answers to human problems--when
the position he is taking prevents him in advance from
understanding the source upon which he has
unknowingly relied.
It is curious that professionals rarely find in the gospel
its profound relevance to psychological problems.
Sooner or later someone has got to exclaim: It is not
because reality is divided into compartments that they
do not find this relevance, or because the spirit and the
psyche operate independently. It is instead because the
prevailing vision of these things is defective. The
traditions by which fallen men have come to explain
their own behavior have served us poorly. What can be
our motivation for clinging to them? I say there is a
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power in the truth, spiritually understood, a power of
both outlook and influence. Beside this the present
theories and helping disciplines are pale.
When we enter into another person's life with
aspirations to help, we tread upon holy ground. Joseph
Smith wrote, "None but fools will trifle with the souls of
men." (Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, p. 137)
With such aspirations it behooves us never to accept
uncritically what we have been taught or to be content
with the understanding we have when our own are
anxious and unsure. Our own souls are on the line with
every soul we counsel. I cannot conceive of anything
more important in this enterprise than that our
understanding, feelings, and intentions be
unselfdeceived and pure.
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